--Reviewed by John D. Haley, B.A., M.A., M.A.
 
 

Since this book is based largely upon eye-witness testimony, it is only fitting that Duffy begins his analysis with a warning about primary sources.  First-hand accounts are not necessarily accurate or reliable accounts, especially when their subject is combat.  The smoke, the noise, and the odor of a battlefield can easily distract a soldier or obstruct his view.  His perception of events might also be distorted by the effects of fear and/or fatigue.  Military historians, for example, occasionally make reference to the doctrine of "five-day fatigue."  Something happens to the soldier on the fifth day of campaign.  Thereafter, his actions become reflexive and automatic.

In addition to these considerations, one must contend with a variety of other, more complex problems.  For one thing, a soldier's rank can influence his understanding of the scope of a campaign.  A standard infantryman is likely to focus on the task at hand, whereas an officer would presumably have a broader understanding of the situation.  Conversely, a general's account of an engagement is less likely to reflect the raw experiences of the men under his command.  Time also plays an important role.  As a rule of thumb, time will pass quickly for men in combat, while it will go more slowly for those who are waiting to enter the fray.  Moreover, this disparity will increase with time.  Any serious scholar knows that, after a prolonged interval (e.g., 20 years or more), a participant's memory is less reliable than it would have been at the time of the actual event.  Finally, as Duffy also notes, all accounts of battle come from men who survived the ordeal--a fact which undoubtedly influences their recollection.

The rest of the book is organized into three sections.  In the first, Duffy describes the general make-up and outlook of an eighteenth-century army.  One of the more interesting aspects of this section is his critique of Europe's "character" in the Age of Reason.  This was a culture which placed great emphasis upon style, etiquette, and protocol.  To that extent, wars were conducted with a remarkable amount of dignity and restraint.  Soldiers of the line wore pigtails and powdered their hair (a few even sported false mustaches), and they polished the barrels of their muskets to a mirror-like perfection.  For similar reasons, officers usually made it a point to learn French--the language of distinction and taste.  They traveled in enviable comfort on the campaign (with up to 145 tons of baggage), and they proudly wore their medals into battle--even under the threat of sniper fire.  In such a refined and well-mannered society as this, the atrocities of twentieth-century warfare would be unthinkable.

The eighteenth century was also an age of limited war.  The actual campaigning season was restricted to about five months out of the year (May through September, or the growing season--when there would be enough grass for horses).  Poor road systems and large stretches of open country also made it difficult to transport troops over great distances.  Finally, one must remember that it took a significant amount of time and effort to train a professional soldier, who subsequently became a rather valuable commodity.  Since officers expected to lose about a third of their men in a single action, they really could not afford to fight a protracted conflict.

In the second portion of his book, Duffy traces the course of an eighteenth-century campaign and battle.  Here, the lay reader may be surprised to learn how advanced military strategy and tactics were in the Age of Reason.  Experienced officers were always on the lookout for signs of the enemy's location and movement.  As Duffy notes, the skilled observer could distinguish between the tracks of men, horses, pack animals, and carts.  Moreover, if a normally busy road was free of traffic, an officer could assume that enemy soldiers were detaining travelers because they were planning a surprise attack or some other maneuver which required secrecy.  Clouds of dust were also indications of enemy activity.  A generalized cloud usually meant that foragers were at work, while dense and isolated clouds often meant that columns of soldiers were already on the march.  Indeed, some officers even knew how to use the sun.  If the reflection of the enemy's muskets and bayonets was perpendicular, they were advancing.  If, on the other hand, the reflection was broken and infrequent, they were in retreat.

The common soldier was also familiar with the various tricks of the trade.  Before an engagement, artillery gunners were very careful to check the balance of the carriage, the evenness of the ground, the quality of the gunpowder, and the direction of the wind, for each of these things affected the accuracy of the weapon.  It was mainly for this reason that, in Austria, gunners were permanently assigned to the same pieces.  Once the battle had begun, riflemen would occasionally aim for their adversaries' legs.  By wounding their opponents, they could increase the burden on enemy resources.  And after the battle, the victors were always wary of "Resurrection Men," or enemy soldiers who pretended to be dead and fired at their opponents' backs.

Finally, in the last portion of his book, Duffy describes the impact which the military institutions of the eighteenth century had on successive generations.  Although this was before the age of mass conscription, the large standing armies of this period certainly contributed to the innovations that were to occur later in the French Revolution and under Napoleon.  Yet, this was still a time in which civilians were seen and treated as non-combatants.  Ironically, the professionalization of these armies (and the automatic increase in the scale and duration of war that came with that professionalization) will ultimately destroy this concept.

For those who may be interested, Mr. Haley also recommends the following:

Anderson, M. S.  The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748.  From Modern Wars in Perspective (New York:  Longman, 1995).

Browning, Reed.  The War of the Austrian Succession (New York:  St. Martin's Pr., 1993).

Chandler, David.  The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough (London:  B. T. Batsford, 1976).

Duffy, Christopher.  The Army of Frederick the Great (London:  David and Charles, 1974).

-----.  The Army of Maria Theresa:  The Armed Forces of Imperial Austria, 1740-1780 (New York:  Hippocrene, 1977).

-----.  The Military Life of Frederick the Great (New York:  Atheneum, 1986).

Rogers, H. C. B.  The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (New York:  Allen and Unwin, 1977).

Strachan, Hew.  European Armies and the Conduct of War (London:  Allen and Unwin, 1983).

Sutton, John L.  The King's Honor and the King's Carnival:  The War of the Polish Succession (Lexington:  Univ. of Kentucky Pr., 1980)