--Reviewed by John D. Haley, B.A., M.A., M.A.
 
 

If the historical record is any indication, war is and always will be an inevitable consequence of human existence.  Few scholars would deny that, in that record, there have been but few years without an armed conflict somewhere on the planet.  Indeed, the most violent century in human history was the last century.  If, then, we cannot eliminate war, we would do well to study it in the hope that we might find ways to reduce its destructive force.  Such is the rationale behind F. E. Adcock's book The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley:  Univ. of California Pr., 1957).

Perhaps the most important point that Adcock makes is that war in classical Greece was, in every conceivable way, a function of the polis or city-state.  Prior to the advent of the polis (ca. 700 B.C.), one cannot truly speak of an "art of war" in Greece.  The epic warfare described in Homer, for example, is certainly passionate, but it involves no real organization or discipline.  Armies simply took the field en masse, and soldiers fought as individual soloists or heroic champions.  Centuries later, the rise of the city-state would completely change all of this.

At this point, it should be noted that, until the age of Alexander, cavalry and specialized or light troops did not play a decisive role in combat.  Neither the stirrup nor the horseshoe had been invented yet, and, therefore, a rider could easily lose his mount in the heat of battle, or his horse might go lame on the rocky terrain.  Moreover, horses require a significant amount of fodder and water--resources which may not be readily available during the campaign season.  Likewise, an archer's bow only had a range of 80-100 yards, and his arrows were rarely strong enough to penetrate enemy shields or armor.  A javelin might be useful in some situations, but its range was limited to about 20 yards, and the thrower could only carry a few at a time.  A slinger, on the other hand, could carry up to 50 sling bullets, but he needed plenty of room on the battlefield, and his weapon was only effective if he had been trained in its use from a very early age on.  Thus, the largest and most important component of any Greek army was its infantry, and, in the classical period, the infantry was composed of soldiers called hoplites.

Although Adcock does not mention this, the hoplite reform probably occurred at about 675 B.C., for it was around that time that a new shield (the hoplon) was introduced in Greece.  Because of the hoplon's design, men were now required to fight in formation (the phalanx).  This development, in turn, led to the standardization of equipment and a generally-accepted set of rules for combat.  Not surprisingly, those rules were also the logical result of conditions generated by the city-state.

For one thing, the hoplite's style of fighting automatically supported the sense of community within the polis.  Essentially, the phalanx formation was an early citizen's militia, and, to a large extent, its effectiveness depended not only upon the skill of those fighting in the front line, but also upon the physical and moral support of those in successive ranks.  Each man's life literally depended on his neighbor's skill and determination.  Thus, community solidarity was vital.  One might even say that the hoplite phalanx fostered a certain esprit de corps within the larger community of the polis.  This was also one of the principal reasons that two or more city-states were reluctant to form alliances with each other.  While an alliance would automatically increase the size of an army, it also meant that the members of one polis would have to concern themselves with the political interests of their ally--a significant strain on domestic policy.

In addition, wars in ancient Greece were generally short and limited.  Since the campaign season began in the summer, men would have to return home in time for the harvest.  Some city-states also had special considerations.  The Spartans, for instance, could not afford a long campaign because a prolonged absence on their part might lead to a helot revolt.  Of course, these restrictions also had a notable impact upon strategy.  Generals preferred to risk everything on one brief, decisive engagement.  Understandably, then, they never kept men in reserve or developed a contingency plan.  For the same reason, they deliberately avoided siege warfare or the use of mercenaries.  Sieges could take months and undermine the reputation of the aggressor.  Since mercenaries profited from war, it was also in their best interest to prolong conflicts.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that these restrictions did indeed reduce the destructive nature of war.  For the Greeks, total annihilation was never the ultimate goal, and civilians were generally viewed and treated as non-combatants.  Today, however, we live in a world in which there is not enough elbow room and too much history.  Memories of past injustices are far too vivid.  When one also considers the impact of modern, mechanized warfare, the Greek idea of war is so far removed as to seem almost mythical.  Yet, this is another lesson which we could learn from the so-called "dead, white, European males."

For those who may be interested, Mr. Haley also recommends the following works:

Dawson, Doyne.  The Origins of Western Warfare:  Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World (Boulder, Colo.:  Westview Pr., 1996).

Ferrill, Arther.  The Origins of War:  From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great (London:  Thames and Hudson, 1985).

Greenhalgh, P. A. L.  Early Greek Warfare:  Horsemen and Chariots in the Homeric and Archaic Ages (Cambridge:  Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1973).

Hanson, Victor Davis.  The Western Way of War:  Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York:  Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).

Hoplites:  The Classical Greek Battle Experience.  Ed. Victor Davis Hanson (New York:  Routledge, 1991).

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